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Nervous System Architecture
Staff College Graduates and the Formation 
of Regular, Territorial Force, New Army, and 
Dominion Divisions, 1914-1916 
B R E N D A N  H O G A N
Abstract : The historiography of the First World War lacks an assessment 
of the role that trained staff officers had during the expansion of the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) between 1914 and 1918. This article 
aims to determine what role staff college graduates played in the early 
expansion of the BEF. The central conclusion of this article is that staff-
trained officers were critical in the expansion of the BEF during the 
war. They occupied all the key command and staff appointments in the 
British regular army, the Territorial Force, New Army, and Dominion 
divisions, both when those formations were formed and when they first 
went into action. The armies of the empire could neither have expanded 
nor functioned without them.
In hIs fInal dIspatch of 21 March 1919, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF) wrote:
The Staff Colleges had only produced a reserve of Staff officers adequate 
to the needs of our Army on a peace footing, and for the mobilisation of 
the Expeditionary Force of six divisions. Consequently, on the expansion 
of the Army during the war[,] many officers had to be recruited for Staff 
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2 Nervous System Architecture
appointments—from good regular officers chiefly, but also from officers 
of our new Armies—and trained for the new duties required of them.1
Haig, like any modern general, needed trained staff officers for 
his army. On the battlefields of the early-twentieth century, one 
man could no longer plan the operations of an army, manage its 
logistics and movements, and command it in battle. Staff officers 
were necessary to plan, prepare, coordinate, and conduct operations. 
Functioning as the “nervous system” of their formations, staff officers 
fulfilled these duties, which, in turn, enabled commanders to lead 
their formations.2 Haig understood that. But how did the War Office 
use the limited cadre of staff-trained officers to which he referred in 
the despatch cited above for a tenfold expansion of the armies to 
a force of two-million men that included divisions from the British 
regular army, the Territorial Force, the New Army, the Dominion 
armies, and India?3 
Staff college graduates held the most important command and 
staff appointments in these divisions, both when they were formed 
and when they first went into action, and were, therefore, critical 
in the expansion of the British Empire armies and their battlefield 
performance. By filling the majority of these appointments, the staff 
1  J.H. Boraston (ed.), Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, December 1915-April 1919 
(London and Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1919), 344. 
2  The nervous system analogy is from Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War 
(New York: Methuen, 1981), 24.
3  British regular army comprised soldiers stationed at home and in imperial garrisons. 
Professional and small in comparison to the conscript armies of the continental 
powers, the British army had a strength of 247,000 officers and soldiers in July 1914. 
Charged with defence of the Home Isles, the Territorial Force had been created 
by Secretary of State for War Richard Haldane in April 1908 after he rationalized 
Britain’s militia, yeomanry, and volunteer units. Haldane envisioned his force of 
part-time soldiers as the basis for supporting and expanding the army during war 
without resorting to conscription. The Territorials had an establishment of 267,000 
men in July 1914. Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener ordered the formation 
of the New Armies in August 1914 to meet the anticipated manpower requirements 
for the war. Volunteers enlisted in the New Army for the duration of the war. The 
Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa all maintained small 
forces of varying strengths that could be expanded and plugged into the larger BEF 
with only minor reorganization and training. That this was possible owed greatly 
to pre-war staff training and efforts to standardize organizational structure. The 
British Indian Army had a further 240,000 men that could be used both to defend 
India or incorporated into an overseas expeditionary force. Bruce Gudmundsson, 
“The Expansion of the British Army during World War I,” in Matthias Strohn (ed.), 
World War I Companion (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013), 47-60. 
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officer cadre of 1914 were the nervous system architecture for the 
building of new formations in the BEF, allowing it to expand from 
six divisions in 1914 to sixty-plus divisions by 1918. They also helped 
train a pool of capable staff officers, either through on-the-job training 
with the staff learner system or as instructors on wartime staff 
courses. Moreover, many staff college graduates eventually moved 
on to command or staff appointments above the divisional level. Not 
all of these officers rose to the occasion, but clearly, the BEF could 
not have expanded in the way that it did were it not for the pre-war 
staff-trained officers, who helped form the central nodes of the staff 
nervous system and grow extra nerves to extend the system to the 
newest limbs of the army.
There are a few studies of pre-war staff training, histories of 
national armies and their wartime expansion, and some initial 
enquiry into divisional commanders and staffs during the First World 
War.4 However, there is presently no literature that examines how 
the limited pool of pre-war-trained staff officers were used to fill the 
key command and staff appointments in the rapidly expanding BEF 
from a cross-national, or imperial, perspective. This article seeks to 
fill at least part of that gap in the historiography of the BEF and 
the First World War. It does so by looking at what roles staff college 
graduates played in the expansion of the BEF, examining what they 
were trained to do, how many were available to do it, how they were 
employed in war, and how well they performed on the battlefield. 
A sample of seventeen regular, Territorial Force, New Army, and 
Dominion divisions—approximately thirty per cent of the total 
4  Included amongst these are: Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff 
College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972); A.R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff 
and the Staff College (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1927); Douglas E. 
Delaney, The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the Dominions 
and India, 1902-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); George Morton-Jack, 
The Indian Army on the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to France 
and Belgium in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014); Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-
1916 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007); Douglas E. Delaney, “Mentoring the 
Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-
1918,” The Journal of Military History 77, 3 (July 2013): 931-953; Paul Martin 
Harris, The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army 
on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); Simon 
Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into Victory 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2005); and Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: 
British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006).
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number of divisions in the BEF in November 1918—will be studied.5 
These divisions were selected because they were raised at different 
points in the war and had varying records of battlefield performance, 
all of which allow a reasonable determination of what roles staff-
trained officers played in different armies and at different times.
Staff officers were made in staff colleges. In the British Empire 
armies, Camberley and Quetta were the principal institutions 
responsible for the professional military education of regular officers 
after their commissioning. Before the First World War, much effort 
5  The divisions selected for this study are: for the regular army, the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 
and 8th Divisions; for the New Army, the 12th (Eastern), 15th (Scottish), 23rd, 
and 35th Divisions; for the Territorial Force, the 47th (2nd London), 56th (1st 
London), 60th (2nd/2nd London), and 62nd (2nd West Riding) Divisions; and for 
the Dominion armies, the 1st Canadian, 2nd Canadian, New Zealand, 1st Australian, 
and 5th Australian Divisions. Notably excluded are the Indian army and Union 
Defence Forces of South Africa. The Indian army contributed most heavily to the 
campaigns in the Middle East, with only two infantry divisions employed on the 
Western Front for twelve months in 1914-1915, and with very few psc-trained officers 
in key appointments. The South Africans only fielded a brigade in Europe, their 
primary contributions of the war being the campaigns against German colonies in 
Africa.
Sir Douglas Haig talking to General Currie. February, 1918. [Library and Archives Canada PA-
002605]
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and thought went into improving the armies of the empire and 
making them more compatible. Post-South African War (1899-1902) 
army reforms and agreements to organize the British, Indian, and 
Dominion armies along the same lines resulted in efforts to school 
staff officers from across the empire at the imperial staff colleges 
of Camberley and Quetta, where candidates undertook an intense 
two-year curriculum, based on the Field Service Regulations.6 
Officers who graduated—earning the coveted post nominals psc 
(passed staff college)—learned how to assist their commanders in 
planning operations, preparing orders, and coordinating the efforts 
of multiple units and formations.7 By 1914, there were 1,004 staff 
college graduates in the army, including officers of the Indian and 
Dominion armies.8 The London School of Economics (LSE) offered 
a six-month course to train selected officers on administrative staff 
duties.9 Some 241 officers completed the LSE course between 1907 
and 1914, 197 of whom were still serving in 1914.10 There were also 
another sixty-eight officers who were qualified for staff employment 
as a result of “service in the field,” plus another 164 still on course at 
Camberley and Quetta.11 In total, therefore, there were 1,433 officers 
available for staff duties by the end of 1914. Still this was insufficient 
for meeting the requirements of an expanded army for continental 
warfare, as Haig alluded above.
6  War Office, Field Service Regulations—Part I: Operations, 1909 (London: His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), 1912); and Field Service Regulations—Part II: 
Organization and Administration, 1909 (London: HMSO, 1914).
7  For an assessment of the training offered by the staff colleges, see Harris, The Men 
Who Planned the War¸ 24-34.
8  Brian Bond claims that the British army only had 447 staff college graduates 
available for service when war broke out in August 1914. This claim has been 
propagated by historians in numerous other studies of staffs during the war. However, 
a re-examination of The Monthly Army List for August 1914 suggests that the figure 
of 447 is incorrect. There were 1,004 serving psc officers, sixty-nine officers qualified 
for staff employment due to their service on the staff in the field, 103 students 
at Camberley, fifty-one students at Quetta, and 234 officers qualified in a course 
of instruction at LSE. This much larger number of trained staff officers than the 
frequently cited figure of 447 although still unable to fill all of the key command and 
staff appointments of a sixty-division BEF. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff 
College, 324; War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914 (Uckfield: Naval 
& Military Press Ltd., 2013), 2523-62.
9  Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British 
Army, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 170-72.
10  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2571-76.
11  Ibid., 2567-70, 2480-81.
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Not all pscs were competent, yet history has unfairly tarnished their 
reputation. In the popular imagination, they are incompetent Captain 
Darlings, or stuffy, out-of-touch aristocrats.12 Many staff officers were 
not well liked, and the frontline soldiers sometimes referred to the staff 
officers as the “bloody red tabs” and blamed them for their misery in 
the trenches and heavy casualties during seemingly-futile offensives.13 
More serious accusations by historians denigrate the staff officers 
for their lack of experience, inherent conservatism, and inability to 
innovate or accept new technologies.14 These criticisms seem especially 
strong in some Australian and Canadian literature, where British 
staff officers are held in some contempt or largely forgotten.15 Worse 
yet, some historians have credited the successes of BEF formations, 
particularly those of the Dominions, to the pluck and supposedly non-
conventional approaches of the non-regulars.16 This perception is not 
borne out by the following examination of selected regular, New Army, 
Territorial Force and Dominion divisions. Indeed, as much as some 
Canadians and Australians disliked the British professional soldier, 
they depended on them, especially in the earlier periods of the war.
In the staff system used by all the British Empire divisions, staff 
work was divided between the general “G” staff, adjutant-general 
“A” staff, and quartermaster-general “Q” staff branches. The general 
officer commanding (GOC) of a division had in his headquarters: 
three “G” staff officers—the general staff officer first grade (GSO 1), 
general staff officer second grade (GSO 2), and general staff officer 
12  Captain Darling is a character in the 1980s television series Blackadder Goes 
Forth. 
13  Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First 
World War (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1993), 113. 
14  Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front & the 
Emergence of Modern War, 1900-1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987); and Martin 
Samuels, Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and 
German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995). 
15  For instance, the Canadian Official History makes only passing reference to the 
role played by British officers in the CEF. G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the 
Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1964), 114-15, 127, 250, 410, 
415, 441, 539-43. 
16  Proponents of the Dominion “supersoldiers” myth include historians Pierre Berton 
and Ted Barris. Pierre Berton, Vimy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986); 
Marching to War: Canada’s Turbulent Years, 1899-1953 (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 
2001), 125-224; and Ted Barris, Victory at Vimy: Canada Comes of Age, April 9-12 
1917 (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2007).
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/2
  7H O G A N 
third grade (GSO 3)—to manage operations and intelligence, as well 
as an “A” and “Q” staff—the assistant adjutant and quartermaster 
general (AA & QMG), deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster 
general (DAA & QMG), and deputy assistant quartermaster 
general (DAQMG)—to handle the administrative and logistical 
requirements.17 His three brigade commanders had brigade majors 
(BM) to manage all of the staff work for the infantry brigades, as 
did the commander Royal Artillery (CRA) to control the divisional 
artillery. In each case, staff officers worked with their counterparts 
in higher, flanking, and lower headquarters to keep abreast of issues, 
future plans, and operations. 
Competent staff officers supported their commanders and were 
the nervous system architecture that helped generate new formations. 
As the relationship of Major-General E.W.B. Morrison, commander 
of the Canadian Corps artillery, and Major Alan F. Brooke, the corps 
staff officer Royal Artillery, illustrates, experienced staff officers 
often made up for their commanders’ lack of experience, technical 
knowledge, or competence.18 Brooke makes it clear in his memoirs 
that he, not Morrison, was the brains behind the Canadian Corps 
artillery writing “I virtually had a free hand in control of the whole 
of the artillery of the corps.”19 Without competent staff officers, 
things could go horribly wrong. Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick 
Stanley Maude, commander of British forces in Mesopotamia and the 
capturer of Bagdad in March 1917, noted a month after the disaster 
at Kut-al-Amara (7 December 1915–29 April 1916), “Staff work has 
been a shortcoming throughout this war. Our number of trained Staff 
Officers was even at first scarcely adequate, but now, with our large 
army, it is dreadful.... It is one of the chief points towards which we 
17  Canadian divisions normally had two GSO 2s and two GSO 3s. Usually, one 
of the GSO 2s and one of the GSO 3s was an experienced British officer who was 
responsible for mentoring his Dominion counterpart in staff duties. Harris, The Men 
Who Planned the War, 126-27.
18  Later Field-Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke of 
Brookeborough. Alanbrooke served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff during the 
Second World War.
19  Field-Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke of Brookeborough, 
“Notes on my life,” 1954, Papers of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke (Alanbrooke 
Papers), 5/2/13, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), King’s College 
London, 59.
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shall have to turn our attention at the end of the war, this training 
of the Staff.”20 
Not all command and staff positions were equally important. 
For the purposes of analysis and explanation, the various divisional 
command and staff appointments have been divided into three tiers. 
The GOC, GSO 1, AA & QMG, and the brigade commanders were 
all first-tier command and staff appointments. Invariably, these were 
the first positions filled when a new division formed. Generally, psc-
trained officers occupied these positions in the regular, Territorial, 
New Army, and Dominion divisions throughout most of the war. 
These command and staff appointments were the nuclei for the 
creation of newly-formed divisions because they could mentor their 
subordinate commanders and staff officers. Dispersing psc-trained 
officers across the BEF helped to ensure a general level of competence 
and ability across all divisions. The second-tier command and staff 
appointments included the GSO 2, GSO 3, DAA & QMG, DAQMG, 
CRA, and the BMs.21 Initially, when the regular and first Dominion 
divisions formed, psc-trained officers held most of these appointments. 
However, as the armies expanded and the war progressed, the BEF 
increasingly formalized its system of staff officer training to fill these 
second-tier appointments. The mentoring system evolved into the 
formalized staff learner programme and the wartime staff colleges at 
Hesdin and Cambridge that produced many excellent staff officers, 
principally from the regular army but also from the Territorial Force, 
New Armies, and the Dominions.22 The third-tier of staff appointments 
included everyone else serving on the divisional staff. However, staff 
training was not critical for third-tier appointments and so will not 
be included for the purposes of this study.
Staff-trained officers played a critical role in the expansion of 
the BEF. When the Territorial Force, New Army, and Dominion 
divisions formed, they encountered numerous problems that trained 
20  Quoted in Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, 268.
21  Although the engineers played an important role in mining operations and 
the construction of defensive works and infrastructure, the commander of Royal 
Engineers and his adjutant are not included in this examination of divisional staffs 
since only forty-six serving RE officers successfully completed staff college before 
August 1914. War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2533-76.
22  The staff learner programme and wartime staff colleges are briefly examined in 
Delaney, The Imperial Army Project, 126-28; and Harris, The Men Who Planned 
the War, 97-122. 
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staff officers and other professionals were instrumental in solving. 
Their soldiers needed to learn how to fight, their officers needed to 
learn how to command, and perhaps most importantly, their staffs 
needed to learn how to plan, coordinate, and manage divisional 
operations. But trained staff officers were scarce, a state of affairs 
made worse by the shortsighted decision to close the staff colleges in 
1914.23 These 1,443 officers filled the majority of the high command 
and senior staff appointments in the BEF and, as historian Simon 
Robbins has argued, formed the “back bone of the BEF in the war 
years and enabled the war to be fought.”24 Apportioning them was 
a complicated affair, however. Despite the shortage of trained staff 
officers in the BEF, many psc officers, believing the war would be 
a short one, sought out regimental command appointments instead 
of serving on a staff. Consequently, a significant percentage of psc-
trained officers were wasted in the first six-to-twelve months of the 
war as they performed regimental duties, instead of serving on a 
staff where their training could have been put to better use.25 It 
should also be noted that The Monthly Army List for August 1914 
included staff-qualified officers like Lieutenant-Generals Sir Douglas 
Haig and Sir Ian Hamilton, and Major-Generals Sir Henry Rawlinson 
and Julian Byng—all of whom held senior command appointments 
and were not available for staff employment. Some psc-qualified 
officers also served in other campaigns, such as those in Palestine 
and Mesopotamia.
The impending shortage of staff-trained officers caused by 
the expansion of the BEF was not immediately apparent in 1914. 
Amongst the regular divisions, the percentage of command and 
staff appointments held by staff-trained officers was extremely high. 
When the 2nd Division first went into action during the Battle of 
Mons (23 August 1914), psc-trained officers held eleven of the fifteen 
23  The War Office had assumed that the conflict would be short; and, upon the 
outbreak of war, students at the staff college received orders to take up their 
appointments in the BEF. Since there was no need to train more officers for a short 
war, the staff colleges closed indefinitely, and the instructors also received orders to 
fill command and staff appointments in the BEF. Bond, The Victorian Army and the 
Staff College, 294-95, 303; and Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, 262.
24  Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, 40-41. 
25  Ibid., 37; and John Hussey, “The Deaths of Qualified Staff Officers in the Great 
War: ‘A Generation Missing?,’” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 
75, 304 (Winter 1997): 246-259.
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key divisional command and staff positions.26 In addition, the AA 
& QMG, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Conway-Gordon had completed the 
administrative course offered at LSE, so, in total, trained staff officers 
actually held twelve of the fifteen key appointments.27 Similarly, when 
the 6th Division mobilized in August, psc-trained officers held eleven 
of the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.28 The 
commander of the 16th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General E.C. 
Ingouville-Williams, had qualified for staff employment due to his 
service on the staff in the field before the First World War, and the 
DAQMG, Major A. Delavoye, had completed the course at LSE.29 So, 
much like the 2nd Division, in the 6th Division trained staff officers 
26  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-2562; and Everard 
Wyrall, The History of the Second Division, 1914-1918 (London, Edinburg, and New 
York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1921), 328-31.
27  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2571.
28  Ibid., 2523-62; and T.O. Marden, A Short History of the Sixth Division, Aug. 
1914-March 1919 (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1920), 109-20.
29  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2568, 2571.
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actually held thirteen of the fifteen key appointments. Clearly, the 
premium the army placed on staff-trained officers is reflected by 
the high percentage of command and staff appointments that these 
officers held. 
Even amongst the divisions that were formed by repatriating 
regular troops from imperial garrisons, the percentage of staff-
trained officers filling the key divisional command and staff positions 
remained high. In October 1914, when the 7th Division first went 
into action at Antwerp, psc-trained officers held ten of the fifteen key 
divisional command and staff positions.30 Although the number of 
staff-trained officers assigned to the 7th Division was lower than the 
formed regular divisions, it was higher, or at least comparable, to the 
number of staff-trained officers assigned to New Army and Territorial 
Force divisions that formed at the same time. In November, when 
the 8th Division fought at Ypres, psc-trained officers held twelve of 
the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.31 The CRA, 
Brigadier-General A.E.A. Holland, although not psc, had qualified 
for staff employment due to his pre-war staff experience, bringing 
the total of staff-trained officers holding key appointments in the 8th 
Division to thirteen.32
Many of these staff officers had served on staffs at the War Office, 
Aldershot Command, and in headquarters of imperial garrisons across 
the empire before the war. For instance, Major-General T. Capper, 
GOC of the 7th Division, had held the appointments of inspector of 
infantry, commandant Quetta, and commander of the 13th Infantry 
Brigade.33 Capper’s counterpart in the 8th Division, Major-General 
F.J. Davies, had served as the director of staff duties at the War 
Office before the war.34 Some officers continued in appointments that 
they had held before the war. For example, Captain G.M. James, 
BM of the 22nd Infantry Brigade, had served as BM of the Pretoria 
garrison before the war, which is where the units that composed 
30  Ibid., 2523-62; and C.T. Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 1914-1918 (London: 
John Murray, 1927), 505-13.
31  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-2562; and J.H. Boraston 
and Cyril E.O. Bax, The Eighth Division in War, 1914-1918 (London: The Medici 
Society Limited, 1926), 286.
32  Ibid., 2568. 
33  Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 3.
34  Boraston and Bax, The Eighth Division in War, 1. 
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the 22nd Brigade had been drawn.35 These instances of familiarity 
between commanders and their staffs enhanced the cohesion and 
corporate spirit of the division—no small feat for a division assembled 
from numerous colonial garrisons.36
During the battles of 1914, trained staffs proved their worth 
immediately during the rapid mobilization of the BEF and its 
operations against the German army. After disembarking in France, 
the staff of the 2nd Division coordinated its assembly and planned 
its advance. Although the division only covered the right flank of 
the BEF at Mons, and thus was spared the worst of the battle, 
the divisional staff managed the rearguard actions that the division 
fought as the BEF retreated.37 Fewer operations of war are more 
difficult than a withdrawal in contact with the enemy. The staff 
of the 6th Division directed a similarly-quick disembarkation and 
concentration.38 Their excellent staff work enabled the division to 
reinforce, in a timely manner, the hard-pressed BEF during the 
Battle of the Aisne on 19 September 1914, just before the BEF 
moved north into Flanders.39 The staff of the 8th Division managed 
its disembarkation and immediately directed some of the division’s 
units into action around Ypres.40 Inspired by wooden tramways used 
for agricultural purposes on farms around his home, the division’s 
AA & QMG decided to use a wooden tramway to supply troops in 
the line.41 Eventually, these light rails became essential for supplying 
the troops in the frontlines and feeding the guns with enormous 
quantities of shells. Still, good staff work could not guarantee success 
in the same way that poor staff planning could guarantee failure. 
The division’s first major attack on the Moated Grange at Neuve 
Chapelle, on 18 December, was a costly affair.42 Inadequate time for 
planning and preparations resulted in heavy causalities and a failure 
to hold captured ground.43 After the 7th Division disembarked on 
6 October 1914, its commanders and staff had little time to plan 
35  Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 4. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Wyrall, The History of the Second Division, 19-52.
38  Marden, A Short History of the Sixth Division, 1.
39  Ibid., 3-5.
40  Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions Part 1, 94.
41  Boraston and Bax, The Eighth Division in War, 8.
42  Ibid., 9-13. 
43  Ibid., 8.
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operations to support the Belgian troops defending Antwerp.44 By the 
time the division arrived, the Germans had already captured most 
of the city. The divisional staff planned and successfully executed a 
number of blocking operations—another withdrawal in contact—to 
cover the rearward movement of the Belgian army.45 Following the 
Belgian withdrawal, the staff planned the division’s own withdrawal 
to Ypres, where it linked up with the other divisions of the BEF on 14 
October, and managed its operations in the battle to defend the city.46 
Few things went according to plan for the BEF, but war on this 
scale and intensity was new to everyone, including the Germans and 
the French. Despite a decade of staff planning, the German Schlieffen 
Plan fell far short of the encirclement battle that it was supposed 
to produce, and the eighteen months that the French staff spent 
tweaking Plan XVII before 1914 very nearly led the French armies to 
disaster. Yet, several historians have singled the British staff out for 
incompetence. In his critical biography of Haig, Denis Winter writes 
that that BEF was “supported by staff work of low quality.”47 Robin 
Prior and Trevor Wilson offer a similar critique of British staff work 
prior to the first day of battle on the Somme (1 July-18 November 
1916): “A more inappropriate way to initiate a great campaign would 
be difficult to imagine.”48 However, these critics ignore the reality 
that faced the staffs of the BEF. The organization was expanding 
rapidly and trained staff officers were overwhelmed mentoring their 
untrained subordinates in staff duties while themselves learning 
how to fight on the Western Front. After the Battle of Loos (25-28 
September 1915), Liberal peer Viscount Haldane perceptively noted:
When we are comparing our Army with Armies that have had a 
General Staff for a hundred years or more, as is the case with the 
German Army, no doubt we have been at a disadvantage, and no doubt 
our disadvantage has been the greater because we have had to expand 
44  Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 8.
45  Ibid.
46  Ibid., 19-56.
47  Denis Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (London: Viking, 1991), 140, 
150.
48  Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2005), 92.
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our Army in France to something like five times the size at which it 
started.49
These circumstances considered, the pscs conducted themselves well. 
At least there was a corps of staff officers that could communicate 
whatever developed and communicate military solutions in a manner 
that all the components of the BEF understood. No action, right or 
wrong would have been possible without them.
The staffs directed the formations of the BEF and kept them 
together during the most difficult and dangerous operation of war: 
a withdrawal in close contact with the enemy. Besides directing the 
operations of the BEF, staffs managed its logistics. They ensured that 
the troops had ammunition, a significant accomplishment considering 
the amount of shells expended by the guns and bullets fired by 
magazine-fed rifles and machine guns. The shortages of ammunition 
that plagued later operations, like Neuve Chapelle (10-13 March 
1915) or Aubers Ridge (9 May 1915), cannot be blamed on the staffs. 
They effectively managed the use of the materiel that the BEF had 
at its disposal. No British soldier was without bullets at any point 
during the early battles of 1914, not even during the most frenzied 
hours and days of the retreat from Mons. In addition, selected officers 
of these staffs subsequently returned to Britain, where they played 
an instrumental role in the formation of New Army and Territorial 
Force divisions. 
After the British government authorized the deployment of the 
BEF to France in August 1914, additional reserves of manpower 
had to be found. Upon Lord Kitchener’s appointment as Secretary 
of State for War on 5 August, he issued his call to arms for 100,000 
volunteers to serve overseas.50 Kitchener predicted a three-year war 
and anticipated the need for at least a further 500,000 troops.51 He 
knew the BEF had to be expanded, but having little faith in the 
Territorial Force, he decided to form New Armies—new divisions of 
49  Viscount Haldane speech to the House of Lords, 16 November 1915, Hansard Vol. 
20, col. 371, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1915-11-16/debates/8f834b0b-
7a9f-4934-b56d-1f09afe1179d/TheHeadquartersStaffAtTheFront, accessed 8 April 
2019.
50  Clive Hughes, “The New Armies,” in Ian F.W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.), 
A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 100.
51  Ibid.
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volunteers recruited for the duration of the war.52 In total, Kitchener 
ordered the formation of five New Armies, which placed nearly 2.5 
million Britons in uniform.53 
To command and staff his New Army divisions, Kitchener 
transferred regular officers, in particular pscs, who had been seconded 
to the Territorial Force, to staff and train the New Armies.54 Some 
officers serving in France, like Major-General Ivor Maxse, returned to 
Britain to command and staff Kitchener’s new divisions.55 Invariably, 
the New Army divisions had fewer pscs than the regular divisions. 
The 12th (Eastern) Division was a bit of an exception in that it had a 
higher proportion of regular officers than other New Army divisions, 
largely due to Kitchener’s efforts to cancel leaves of Indian army officers 
and recall recently-retired officers to active service. Major-General Sir 
J.M. Babington, the GOC of the 23rd Division, was one such example 
of the latter group.56 For the duration of the war, regular officers filled 
the majority of the staff appointments in the New Army divisions. 
Regular officers on the divisional staff typically held great sway with 
their GOCs, who were always regular officers and distrustful of their 
“amateur” subordinates.57 Staff-trained officers made the New Army 
divisions run. They provided the necessary nuclei for divisions to 
expand and learn how to fight on the Western Front.
By the time New Army divisions deployed to the continent, the 
pool of staff-trained officers available for service on divisional staffs 
had been depleted. Already a precious and scarce commodity, many 
52  The amateur soldiers of the Territorial Force were not subject to involuntary 
overseas service. The strength of the Territorial Force in July 1914 was 268,777 
officers and men, of which only 18,683 had agreed to serve overseas in the event of 
war. Beckett, “The Territorial Force,” in Beckett and Simpson (eds.), A Nation in 
Arms, 130.
53  Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, xiv.
54  Beckett, “The Territorial Force,” 131. On the important role that British regular 
army officers had throughout the war as both commanders and trainers, see Peter 
E. Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First World War 
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2015). 
55  Although the circumstances of Maxse’s reassignment suggest that Haig and Field-
Marshal Sir John French, the C-in-C of the BEF, doubted Maxse’ command abilities, 
Maxse later proved to be an excellent trainer and leader. Under his command, 
the 18th (Eastern) Division became one of the best divisions in the BEF. Nikolas 
Gardner, Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 
(Westport: Praeger, 2003), 96-98; Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 
1914-18, 87; and Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 306, 317-318. 
56  Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 217. 
57  Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 297; and Hughes, “The New Armies,” 121.
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pscs had been killed commanding units or promoted to corps and 
army staffs. In June 1915, when the 12th Division first went into the 
line, psc-trained officers held only six of the fifteen key divisional 
command and staff positions, a considerably lower proportion than 
existed in the regular divisions.58 Although neither the GOC nor 
his brigade commanders had completed any staff training, all of the 
GSOs, AA & QMG, the BM RA, and one of the infantry brigade 
BMs were psc-qualified. During the division’s first major action—the 
largely disastrous Battle of Loos—the staff coordinated a relief of 
the Guards Division and organized a stout defence against numerous 
counterattacks.59 In follow-on operations, the 12th Division suffered 
heavy casualties including its commander, Major-General F.D.V. 
Wing, who was killed on 2 October.60 When the 15th (Scottish) 
Division first went into the line in July 1915, psc-trained officers held 
six of the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.61 The 
15th Division’s history notes, “At no time were there more than five 
Regular officers in any one brigade, including the staff, the seniors 
[officers] being retired Regulars, Militia officers, or Territorials.”62 
The AA & QMG, Lieutenant-Colonel E.F. Taylor had completed the 
administrative course offered at LSE, so the division had seven trained 
staff officers in key appointments.63 In the 15th Division’s first major 
action at Loos, it made the furthest advance of any British division in 
a day’s battle between the outbreak of war and the Battle of Cambrai 
(20 November-7 December 1917).64 However, without adequate and 
responsive artillery support, or sufficient reserves, the division was 
58  Arthur B. Scott and P. Middleton Brumwell, History of the 12th (Eastern) 
Division in the Great War, 1914-1918 (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1923), 238-49; 
and War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
59  Scott and Brumwell, History of the 12th (Eastern) Division in the Great War, 
1914-1918, 12-25. 
60  “Casualty Details: Wing, Frederick Drummond Vincent,” Commonwealth 
War Graves Commission (CWGC), http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead/
casualty/466353/WING,%20FREDERICK%20DRUMMOND%20VINCENT, 
accessed 18 December 2015; and Scott and Brumwell, History of the 12th (Eastern) 
Division in the Great War, 15. 
61  J. Stewart and John Buchan, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914-1919 
(London and Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1926), 294-300; and War 
Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
62  Stewart and Buchan, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 3.
63  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914¸ 2571. 
64  Stewart and Buchan, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 51.
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not able to exploit its initial successes.65 In September 1915, when the 
23rd Division first went into the line near Armentières, psc-trained 
officers only held four of the fifteen key divisional command and 
staff positions.66 Similarly, in July 1916, when the 35th Division first 
went into action during the Battle of the Somme, psc-trained officers 
held five of the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.67 
Major-General R.J. Pinney, the GOC, was one of numerous regular 
army officers brought back from France to fill key command and 
staff appointments in the New Armies.68 In the New Army divisions, 
65  Ibid.
66  H.R. Sandilands, The 23rd Division, 1914-1919 (Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1925), 353-59; and War Office, The Monthly Army List for 
August 1914, 2523-62.
67  H.M. Davson, The History of the 35th Division in the Great War (London: Sifton 
Praed & Co., Ltd., 1926), 317-18; and War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 
1914, 2523-62.
68  Davson, The History of the 35th Division in the Great War, 4. 
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few pscs filled BM or second-tier staff positions. They simply were 
not available. 
Kitchener had few pscs to command his new divisions and serve 
of their staffs. The lower proportion of staff-trained officers in New 
Army divisions reflected two things—that they were formed after the 
assembly of the regular divisions and that psc officers were scarce. 
Kitchener tried to staff his division with experienced officers, but 
the creation of the New Armies quickly drained the pool of available 
pscs. The manpower requirements of the BEF and the imperative to 
maintain the efficiency of the regular divisions limited the number 
of staff-trained officers that Kitchener could repatriate from France. 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Burnett-Stuart, the GSO 1 of 15th Division 
(and future commandant of the staff school at Hesdin), for example, 
understood the necessity of an effective staff. Like other regular 
officers seconded to the New Army divisions—both staff-trained and 
not—he mentored his subordinates and worked to build the “excellent 
relations [that] existed between the Divisional staff and all other 
headquarters in the division.”69 Working staffs were too important to 
give up. The few pscs that did serve in New Army divisions generally 
filled the most critical roles. Most importantly, they mentored their 
inexperienced peers and subordinates and to make them proficient in 
staff duties. 
Generally, in the Territorial Force divisions, psc-qualified officers 
only held the first-tier command and staff positions. The Territorial 
divisions had to compete with New Army and Dominion divisions, 
which were being formed at the same time, for the few trained staff 
officers still available for service. Although distrusted by Kitchener, 
the Territorial Force made up the majority of the infantry battalions 
in the BEF. By 1918, 692 Territorial battalions had been raised, 
versus 557 New Army and 267 regular battalions.70 In August 1914, 
when the 47th (2nd London) Division mobilized for full-time service, 
psc-trained officers only held five of fifteen key divisional command 
and staff positions.71 The GOC, Major-General Sir Charles St. Leger 
Barter understood that his staff and troops were inexperienced, and 
69  Stewart and Buchan, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 60.
70  Beckett, “The Territorial Force,” 132.
71  Alan H. Maude, The History of the 47th (London) Division, 1914-1919 (London: 
Amalgamated Press Ltd., 1922), 230-31; and War Office, The Monthly Army List for 
August 1914, 2523-62.
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he requested that his division not be committed to battle during the 
Second Battle of Ypres (22 April-25 May 1915), until it was properly 
trained and ready.72 GHQ approved his request and sent the division 
to the quieter Béthune sector, so that the troops could become more 
familiarized with trench warfare and the staff proficient in their 
duties.73 Major H.V. de la Fontaine had previously served in France 
with the East Surrey Regiment before he was recalled to fill the AA 
& QMG appointment.74 He was an excellent administrator and an 
expert on administrative matters, no doubt due to the education he 
received at Camberley. One officer remarked, “Many of us have often 
had to consult [de la Fontaine] at divisional headquarters, where he 
used to work till nearly midnight, behind a pile of cigarette ends, 
and usually with an extinct cigar between his lips.”75 The state of 
his divisional staff was not unique amongst early-forming territorial 
divisions. In February 1916, when the 56th (1st London) Division 
entered the frontlines around Hallencourt, psc-trained officers held 
four of the fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.76
In the reinforcement Territorial divisions, staff-trained officers 
similarly held only a third of the command and staff appointments. 
In June 1916, when the 60th (2nd/2nd London) Division first went 
into the line near Vimy Ridge, psc-trained officers held just four of 
the key divisional command and staff positions.77 The GOC, Major-
General E.S. Bulfin, had qualified for staff employment due to his 
service on staffs during the South African War, bringing the total to 
five.78 Bulfin had commanded a brigade in 1914 and distinguished 
himself during the fighting on the Aisne and near Ypres, before he was 
brought back from France to take command of the division.79 When 
the 62nd (2nd West Riding) Division first went into the line near the 
72  Maude, The History of the 47th (London) Division, 11.
73  Ibid. 
74  Ibid., 4.
75  Quoted in Ibid., 5. 
76  C.H. Dudley Ward, The 56th Division (1st London Territorial Division) (London: 
John Murray, 1921), 315-23; and War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 
1914, 2523-62.
77  A.F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions, Part 2A & 2B: Territorial & Yeomanry 
Divisions (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2007), 69-75; and War Office, The 
Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
78  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914¸ 2568. 
79  P.H. Dalbiac, History of the 60th Division (2/2nd London Division) (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1927), 34. 
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Ancre valley in January 1917, psc-trained officers held four of the 
fifteen key divisional command and staff positions, while the DAA & 
QMG, Major H.F. Lea, had qualified for staff employment as a result 
of previous service.80 The GOC, Major-General W.P. Braithwaite, a 
former Quetta commandant, had also served as the chief of staff for 
the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) before dismissal from 
the post.81 Fortunately for the division, he performed much better 
as GOC than he did as chief of staff. Of note, only three Territorial 
Force officers commanded divisions, and just three became GSO 1s 
during the war.82 Like the New Army divisions, Territorial divisions 
had considerably fewer pre-war staff-trained officers than the regular 
divisions. 
80  Everard Wyrall, The History of the 62nd (West Riding) Division, 1914-1919, 
Volume I (London, Edinburgh and New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1921), 
239-41; and War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62, 2570. 
81  Wyrall, The History of the 62nd (West Riding) Division, 7.
82  Beckett, “The Territorial Force,” 141.
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Although they were few in number, these pscs proved their 
worth. The Territorial divisions examined in this study had rough 
introductions to battle. The 47th Division sustained high casualties 
and failed to hold captured ground during the Battle of Festubert 
(15-25 May 1915), and the 56th Division failed to secure the 
Gommecourt salient on the first day of the Battle of the Somme.83 
The staffs may have had a poor beginning, but they sent “lessons 
learned” to corps and army headquarters, where staffs at these 
headquarters distributed them around the entire BEF.84 This was 
the sort of dynamic learning process that resulted in new tactics 
and equipment, such as those espoused in SS143 Instructions of 
the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917 or Brooke’s 
map-form orders for a rolling barrage.85 There were no easy battles 
during the war, but these lessons that were learned on the battlefield, 
and shared amongst staffs throughout the entire BEF, enabled it to 
eventually defeat the German army on the battlefield.86 By filling 
the first-tier command and staff appointments in the divisions, they 
provided much needed competence and mentorship. Generally, the 
later a division was formed, the fewer staff-trained officers it had. 
Towards the end of the war, few pscs were still serving on divisional 
staffs, those positions being mostly filled by graduates of the wartime 
staff courses. Most pre-war graduates of Camberley and Quetta were 
employed in corps and army headquarters by that time.
Like Britain, none of the Dominions were prepared to fight an 
industrial war in 1914. In Canada, the militia was an amateurish 
force, and its officers lacked the necessary command experience and 
staff knowledge to plan and direct large formations. The twelve psc-
trained officers that Canada had available were insufficient to fill 
all the required staff positions in the rapidly-expanding Canadian 
Expeditionary Force (CEF).87 Fortunately, pre-war efforts to 
83  Maude, The History of the 47th (London) Division, 11-24; and Dudley Ward, The 
56th Division (1st London Territorial Division), 11-48.
84  Harris, The Men Who Planned the War, 114-22; and Bill Rawling, Surviving 
Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 (Toronto, Buffalo 
and London: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 67-68.
85  On the platoon tactics promulgated in SS 143, see Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics 
of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-1918 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 194. Brooke, “Notes on my life,” 1954 Alanbrooke 
Papers, 5/2/13, LHCMA, King’s College London, 52-53.
86  On the dissemination of learning in the BEF, see Fox, Learning to Fight, 78-101.
87  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62. 
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standardize organizational structure and staff training enabled 
Dominion formations to be plugged into the BEF with only minor 
reorganization and training. Still, Canadian efforts to field divisions 
were as anything but smooth, mostly because of the actions of Sam 
Hughes, the minister of militia and defence.88 Hughes threw out 
existing expeditionary force plans and improvised the mobilization 
of the CEF with his own erratic methods, so that he could fill the 
senior ranks of the division with his political cronies—not exactly a 
recipe for success.
The other Dominions also began to form new formations from 
their own volunteer forces for overseas service. In August 1914, the 
Australians offered Britain an expeditionary force of 20,000 men, 
organized into an infantry division and a light horse brigade.89 
Originally destined for England for further training, elements of 
the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) were diverted to Egypt on 3 
February 1915, to counter a Turkish attack against the Suez Canal.90 
Once complete in Egypt, the 1st Australian Division received orders 
to prepare for the assault against the Dardanelles in April 1915.91 In 
August 1914, the New Zealand government had offered to raise two 
brigades but, by 1916, it increasingly pressured the War Office to 
allow the Dominion to form its own division, and the War Office, after 
consultation with the Australian government, agreed in March 1916.92 
Early-forming Dominion divisions generally had higher numbers 
of pscs in key appointments. This initially had less to do with the 
number of staff-trained officers that the Dominions had available 
than it did with the relatively large numbers of imperial pscs the 
War Office was willing to lend. The British army initially seconded 
88  For an assessment of Hughes, see Ronald G. Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public 
Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916 (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier 
University Press, 1986). 177-312; and Tim Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 
The Sensational Wars of Sam Hughes and General Arthur Currie (Toronto: Penguin 
Canada, 2010), 57-71, 98-130. 
89  F.W. Perry, Order of Battle of Divisions: Part 5A, The Divisions of Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand and those in East Africa (Newport: Ray Westlake, 1992), 
14. 
90  C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: Volume 
I—The Story of ANZAC: The First Phase (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1921), 
163-64. 
91  Ibid., 213. 
92  H. Stewart, The New Zealand Division, 1916-1919: A Popular History Based on 
Official Records (Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin and Wellington: Whitecombe 
and Tombs Limited, 1921), 5-6.
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some of its best officers to fill command and staff appointments in 
the Dominion divisional headquarters, where they also mentored 
Dominion officers. As the Australian official history outlined when 
units first arrived in France in 1916: 
It was unavoidable that a number of the higher staff officers, especially 
of the general staff, should be borrowed from the British, the trained 
Australian staff being very small and the number of officers to whom 
the actual planning of operations could be safely entrusted being still 
few.93
In April 1915, when the 1st Canadian Division first went into action 
during the Second Battle of Ypres, psc-trained officers held ten of the 
93  C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918: Volume 
III—The Australian Imperial Force in France 1916 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1941), 46.
Major-General A.C. Macdonnell and Staff, 1st Canadian Infantry Division. [Library and 
Archives Canada PA-002620]
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fifteen key divisional command and staff positions.94 Five of these pscs 
were experienced British officers—Major-General E.A.H. Alderson, 
Colonel C.F. Romer, Colonel T.B. Wood, Major G.C.W. Gordon-
Hall, and Major R.J.F. Hayter—who all filled first-tier positions 
on the staff.95 They increased the effectiveness of the division and 
mentored the junior staff officers in the performance of their staff 
duties. It is worth noting that Brigadier-General M.S. Mercer, the 
94  A. Fortescue Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 
1914-1915: Chronology, Appendices and Maps (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1938), 428-
30; Kenneth Radley, We Lead Others Follow: First Canadian Division, 1914-1918 
(St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2006), 382-84; and War Office, The 
Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
95  Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid to C.G.S., “List of British Officers Who Served with 
Canadian Troops in the Field,” 5 October 1927, RG 24, Vol. 447, HQ 54-21-1-203, 
Library and Archives Canada (LAC); and “Command and Staff Appointments in 
the CEF and OMFC [Overseas Military Forces of Canada],” n.d., RG 150, Vol. 473, 
LAC.
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commander of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General 
A.W. Currie, commander of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
and Lieutenant-Colonel G.B. Hughes, BM of the 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, had all completed the militia staff course (MSC) 
before the war.96 In total, trained staff officers held thirteen of the 
fifteen key appointments. The number of pscs holding command and 
staff appointments in the division was as high as the formed regular 
divisions, and certainly better than most New Army and Territorial 
Force divisions that formed around the same time.
Many of the psc-qualified officers serving on the 1st Canadian 
Division staff in April 1915, including imperial officers, had served 
in Canada and held staff appointments at some point before the war. 
For instance, Alderson had served in Nova Scotia for two years as a 
junior officer and had two Canadian battalions under his command 
during the South African War.97 Gordon-Hall was serving on the 
Canadian general staff as the director of operations and staff duties.98 
He joined the CEF immediately when the war began. Hayter, a 
Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) graduate who had taken 
an imperial commission, was also serving in Canada and joined the 
CEF when the war began.99 Before the war, Brigadier-General H.E. 
Burstall served as commandant of the Canadian Royal School of 
Artillery, making him an ideal candidate for CRA.100 Major A.H. 
Macdonell, the GSO 2, had graduated from Camberley in 1906 and 
was serving as the assistant adjutant general for administration, 1st 
Divisional Area in Canada in August 1914.101 Wood, another imperial 
96  For an examination of the MSC, see Andrew Brown, “Cutting Its Coat According 
to the Cloth: The Canadian Militia and Staff Training before the Great War,” War 
& Society 34, 4 (March 2016): 263-86.
97  “List of British Officers Holding Command and Staff Appointments in the CEF,” 
7 November 1916, RG 9 III, Vol. 30, LAC.
98  Gordon Charles William Gordon-Hall Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-
93/166, Box 3655-45, LAC; and War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 
1914, 2556.
99  Ross John F. Hayter Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4195-
30, LAC; “List of British Officers Holding Command and Staff Appointments in the 
CEF,” 7 November 1916, RG 9 III, Vol. 30, LAC; and War Office, The Monthly Army 
List for August 1914, 2555.
100  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2544; and Henry Edward 
Burstall Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1319-21, LAC. 
101  Archibald Hayes Macdonell Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 
6773-39, LAC; and War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2544.
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officer, had served in Canada for four years before the war in a 
variety of appointments, including commandant of RMC.102
When the 1st Australian Division landed at Anzac Beach on 25 
April 1915, staff-trained officers filled six of the fifteen key divisional 
command and staff appointments.103 Although the division had 
fewer pscs than the British regular divisions and the 1st Canadian 
Divisions, it had more staff-trained officers in its headquarters than 
the Territorial Force divisions and other late-forming Dominion 
divisions. The pscs who served on the divisional staff during the 
Gallipoli campaign (17 February 1915-9 January 1916) subsequently 
played an important role in the expansion of the AIF. After the 
division withdrew from Gallipoli in December, its officers, in particular 
the pscs, were central in the “doubling” process that grew the AIF 
from two infantry divisions to five. For example, Majors T.A. Blamey 
and J. Gellibrand, from the 1st Australian Division, went to the 
2nd Australian Division Headquarters in July 1915.104 Furthermore, 
a number of British officers, most of whom had been serving with the 
Australian army before the war began, also served on various AIF 
staffs and held command appointments.105 These included Major D.J. 
Glasfurd, GSO 2, Major S.M. Anderson, BM RA, Brigadier-General 
E.G. Sinclair-MacLagan, commander of the 3rd Australian Infantry 
Brigade, and Captain F.D. Irvine, BM of the 1st Australian Infantry 
Brigade.106 
In September 1915, when the 2nd Canadian Division arrived in 
France, psc-trained officers held only four of the fifteen key divisional 
command and staff positions, a sign that staff-trained officers in the 
102  Thomas Birchall Wood Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 
10542-27, LAC; “Notes on British Officers Who Served with CEF,” n.d., RG 24, 
Vol. 1764, LAC. 
103  Australian Imperial Force, Staff Regimental and Gradation List of Officers, 22nd 
September 1914 (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1914), 5, 10-13, 17, 21; and War 
Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
104  Robert C. Stevenson, To Win the Battle: The 1st Australian Division in the Great 
War, 1914-18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5. 
105  Australian Military Forces, Officers’ List of the Australian Military Forces, 1 
August 1914 (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1914), 7-17, 20, 26, 31, 33, 35, 38-40.
106  Ibid., 22, 34, 201; and Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 
1914–1918: Volume I, 50-51.
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CEF were already scarce by the spring of 1915.107 Three of these were 
experienced imperial officers: Colonel H.D. de Prée, GSO 1, Major 
C.A. Ker, GSO 2, and Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Stewart, BM of the 
4th Canadian Infantry Brigade.108 Brigadier-General L.G.F.M. Lord 
Brooke, although not psc-qualified, commanded the 4th Brigade.109 
Sam Hughes criticized the decision to appoint British officers to 
the senior staff positions instead of Canadians, and he arrogantly 
remarked that “the men who fought well at St. Julien and Festubert 
require no staff college theorists to direct them.”110 However, these 
British officers provided Canadian commanders and staff officers 
with rudimentary command and staff training, since many of the 
Canadian officers lacked both field command experience and staff 
training. The arrival of the 2nd Canadian Division in France and 
the subsequent formation of Canadian Corps only exacerbated the 
shortage of trained staff officers.
Amongst the Dominion divisions formed later in the war, 
the percentage of trained staff officers filling command and staff 
appointments on a divisional staff tended to be quite low. In April 
1916, when the New Zealand Division left Egypt to fight in France, 
psc-trained officers only held two of the fifteen key divisional 
command and staff positions, and Lieutenant-Colonel H.G. Reid, 
the AA & QMG, had completed the administrative course offered 
at LSE.111 In total, staff-trained officers held three of the fifteen 
key appointments. Although the GOC and most of his subordinate 
commanders and staff had not completed any staff training, the GSO 
1 and the AA & QMG, both first-tier staff positions, continued to be 
held by staff-trained officers, which provided the necessary nervous 
system nodes for the division to learn how to fight on the Western 
Front. During the disastrous attack at Fromelles (19-20 July 1916), 
only one psc-trained officer held a staff appointment in the 5th 
107  Duguid to C.G.S., “List of British Officers Who Served with Canadian Troops in 
the Field,” 5 October 1927, RG 24, Vol. 447, HQ 54-21-1-203, LAC; “Command and 
Staff Appointments in the CEF and OMFC,” n.d., RG 150, Vol. 473, LAC; and War 
Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62.
108  Duguid to C.G.S., “List of British Officers Who Served with Canadian Troops in 
the Field,” 5 October 1927, RG 24, Vol. 447, HQ 54-21-1-203, LAC.
109  Ibid. 
110  Quoted in Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World 
War, 128.
111  War Office, The Monthly Army List for August 1914, 2523-62, 2575; and Stewart, 
The New Zealand Division, 1916-1919, 14-16.
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Australian Division.112 For the Canadians, many of the pscs that 
served in Canadian divisions had been promoted to staff appointments 
in the Canadian Corps headquarters. For the Australians and New 
Zealanders, many of their staff-trained officers had moved up to the 
I and II ANZAC Corps headquarters or served on staffs of divisions 
that formed earlier in the war. 
Although capable of planning and directing the operations that 
established the reputations of the Dominion corps as shock troops in 
the latter half of the war, the staffs of Dominion divisions, like their 
British counterparts, experienced growing pains before they became 
proficient. Shortly after the 1st Canadian Division moved into the 
Ypres salient in April 1915, it defended the city following a German 
112  A.D. Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division: Being an Authoritative 
Account of the Division’s Doings in Egypt, France and Belgium (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton Limited, 1920), 22. 
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gas attack and held the frontline.113 Many of the staff officers exercised 
great initiative, often making up for their commanders’ mistakes. 
After Currie left his headquarters to fetch reinforcements for his 
2nd Brigade, Kemmis-Betty effectively assumed command of the 
brigade and directed its defence of Gravenstafel Ridge.114 Similarly, 
after the divisional headquarters lost contact with the 2nd and 3rd 
Brigades, Gordon-Hall went forward, conducted an appreciation of 
the situation, formulated a plan, and issued orders to the brigade 
commanders to close the gaps between their brigades.115 
The 1st Australian Division also underwent a miserable baptism 
of fire at Gallipoli in April 1915. Inexperienced and unfit officers 
riddled the divisional staff, and they failed at planning and managing 
the complexities of an amphibious operation.116 Shortages of weapons 
and ammunition compounded these failures in command and staff 
procedures.117 Despite these shortcomings, the staff, after some 
personnel changes, did effectively plan and manage the evacuation 
of the division from Gallipoli. General Sir John Monash, later the 
commander of the Australian Corps, praised the evacuation: “It 
was a most brilliant conception, brilliantly organized, and brilliantly 
executed.”118 The Dominion staffs were learning and improving. 
The late-forming Dominion divisions fought in their first 
engagements with mixed results. The 2nd Canadian Division did 
not fare as well in its first combat action during the Battle of the St. 
Eloi Craters (27 March-16 April 1916). The division failed to hold 
the craters, the troops suffered horribly throughout the action, and 
Major-General Richard Turner and his staff, which included a psc-
qualified imperial officer as GSO 1, did little to restore command and 
control amidst the chaos of the battle.119 Not all Camberley graduates 
were competent. The New Zealand Division first went into action 
during the Battle of Flers-Courcelette (15-22 September 1916) and 
113  Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War, 49-92; 
and Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Canadian Division at War, 1914-
1915 (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 97-164.
114  Radley, We Lead Others Follow, 194. 
115  Ibid., 195. 
116  Stevenson, To Win the Battle, 135-136.
117  Ibid., 136.
118  Quoted in Ibid., 135. 
119  Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War, 129-
159.
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did quite well.120 The staff planned a barrage that silenced most of 
the German guns and knocked out many of the German machine 
guns, which allowed the infantry to advance and secure the village 
of Flers.121 The 5th Australian Division first went into action during 
the attack at Fromelles, which was a diversionary action during the 
Somme offensive. The attack failed, and the division sustained over 
5,500 casualties.122 Although the Australian Official History and the 
5th Australian Division’s historian, both adherents of the “Digger” 
myth, have laid much of the blame upon Lieutenant-General 
Richard Haking, IX Corps commander, and his staff, the divisional 
commander, Major-General J.W. McCay, must also shoulder some 
of the blame.123 A militia general and a former minister of defence, 
McCay neither ordered his division to consolidate its initial gains nor 
ensured that his staff adequately planned the operation.124 
Still, staff-trained officers were a valuable commodity in the 
BEF, and after their initial engagements with their divisions, many 
of them went on to hold important command and staff positions. 
While some may have failed in certain appointments, the War 
Office almost always found some way to use the administrative and 
technical knowledge that they had learned at the staff colleges. For 
instance, the British official historian of the Great War, Brigadier-
General Sir James Edmonds began the war as the GSO 1 of the 4th 
Division. However, he broke down under the strain of his duties and 
had to be replaced shortly after hostilities commenced.125 Others were 
more successful. Brigadier-General R.J. Pinney, the commander of 
the 23rd Infantry Brigade, was promoted to major-general and given 
command of the 35th Division.126 Captain J.G. Dill, the BM of the 
25th Infantry Brigade, eventually became a field-marshal and served 
as Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the beginning of the Second 
120  Stewart, The New Zealand Division, 1916-1919, 6.
121  Ibid., 73-88.
122  Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, 112.
123  Ibid., 81; Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918: 
Volume III, 328-90; and Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, 
20, 75. 
124  Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 102-03; and Stevenson, To Win the Battle, 163.
125  Harris, The Men Who Planned the War, 44.
126  Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, 57.
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World War.127 Lieutenant-Colonel J. Burnett-Stuart also went on to 
have an exemplary military career. He performed quite well as the 
GSO 1 of the 15th Division and, in December 1915, GHQ selected 
him to open a small wartime staff college at Hesdin in France in an 
effort to redress the shortage of trained staff officers.128 This began 
the process of standardized wartime staff training for the BEF. 
Captain H.F. Baillie, the GSO 3, moved up into a GSO 2 position in 
III Corps before returning to the division as GSO 1 in May 1917.129 
Many of the officers the British army seconded to the Canadian 
Corps and the few Canadian pscs also went on to have distinguished 
military careers. After serving as GSO 1 of the 1st Canadian Division, 
Cecil Romer went on to command the 59th (2nd North Midland) 
Division towards the end of the war and became the adjutant general 
for the forces in the interwar years.130 After G.C.W. Gordon-Hall’s 
tenure as GSO 2 of the 1st Canadian Division, he served as GSO 2 of 
127  Ibid., 41.
128  Ibid., 41-42; and Harris, The Men Who Planned the War, 106-07. 
129  Stewart and Buchan, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914-1919, 294-95. 
130  “Notes on British Officers Who Served with CEF,” n.d., RG 24, Vol. 1764, LAC.
Two Canadian staff officers. May, 1917. [Library and Archives Canada PA-001293]
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the Canadian Corps, from January until May 1916.131 R.J.F. Hayter 
rose from major to brigadier-general.132 Before he became BGGS in 
October 1918, he had served as GSO 2 of the 2nd Canadian Division, 
GSO 1 of the 3rd and 1st Canadian Divisions, and commanded the 
10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the last British officer to command 
a brigade in the Canadian Corps. After Harry Burstall’s tenure as 
CRA, he was promoted to major-general and appointed GOC of the 
Royal Canadian Artillery from 1915 until 1916, when he became the 
GOC of the 2nd Canadian Division, which he commanded until the 
end of the war.133 A.H. Macdonell rose quickly through the ranks and 
commanded the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade from March 1916 
until July 1917.134
This study indicates that staff-trained officers were critical in the 
growth and the battlefield performance of the British Empire armies of 
the First World War. They occupied most of the key command and staff 
positions in the divisions when the formations were formed and first went 
into action. Generally, pscs held all of the key command and staff positions 
in regular and early-forming Dominion divisions, the latter of which were 
fortunate in that they simply held on to their on-loan imperial officers, 
many of whom were psc, to supplement their early contingents.135 Since 
the pool of staff-trained officers had been drained by the time the New 
Army, Territorial, and later Dominion divisions formed, they only held 
the first-tier appointments on the divisional staffs for those late-forming 
formations. Throughout the war, pscs were always the first appointed to 
first-tier positions in new divisions, sometimes even before the GOC had 
been identified. They were also critical in generating new staff officers for 
the nervous system architecture. They established and ran the wartime 
staff courses, and they mentored officers of identified talent through the 
staff learner system. By the end of the war, few pscs remained in divisional 
headquarters. Most of them had moved ‘up’ by that time—way up the 
131  Gordon Charles William Gordon-Hall Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-
93/166, Box 3655-45, LAC.
132  Ross John F. Hayter Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4195-
30, LAC; and “Command and Staff Appointments in the CEF and OMFC,” n.d., 
RG 150, Vol. 473, LAC.
133  Henry Edward Burstall Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 
1319-21, LAC.
134  Archibald Hayes Macdonell Personnel File, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 
6773-39, LAC. 
135  For an assessment of the system of loans, attachments, and interchanges between 
the British army and the Dominions, see Delaney, The Imperial Army Project, 61-94.
32
Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/2
  33
H
O
G
A
N
 
33
Hogan: Nervous System Architecture
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019
34 Nervous System Architecture
chain of command—to command and staff appointments in corps and 
army headquarters. 
This examination also finds that, with the exception of the GOC and 
GSO 1 appointments, fewer psc-trained officers held command and staff 
appointments during the formation of Territorial Force, New Army, and 
late-forming Dominion divisions. By the time these divisions formed 
and first went into action, the pool of staff-trained officers available for 
service on a divisional staff had been largely depleted. Already a precious 
and scarce commodity, many pscs had been killed commanding units or 
promoted to corps and army staffs as the BEF continued to expand. In some 
instances, pscs serving in France or Belgium returned to England to help 
form these new divisions, and they continued to serve on the divisional 
staffs throughout the formation’s training, familiarization period, and first 
major action. On average, from the New Army and Territorial divisions 
examined, trained staff officers held five of the fifteen key divisional 
command and staff positions, while the late-forming Dominion divisions 
had three pscs employed in these roles. 
Finally, this inquiry finds that the importance of trained staff 
officers and the role they played in the building of the BEF cannot 
be overstated. More work, however, still needs to be done in order 
to gain a more definitive understanding of the role played by staff-
trained officers who had gained their qualifications before the end of 
1914. This article surveyed approximately 30 per cent of the divisions 
in the BEF in 1918, and it only accounted for their formation and first 
major action. An examination of all of the divisions in the BEF and 
other expeditionary forces, from their formation until the armistice in 
November 1918, is warranted to determine how staff-trained officers 
were employed in the larger imperial army. For most of the war, psc-
trained officers held the majority of the first-tier divisional command 
and staff appointments. By holding these critical appointments, these 
officers were the very architecture of the staff nervous system, which 
allowed the BEF to expand from a small six-division force in 1914 
to a highly-effective sixty-division imperial army by 1918. They 
commanded the battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies, 
and they planned and directed the operations of the BEF during 
a four-year slugging match with the German army on the Western 
Front. Towards the end of the war, officers trained through the staff 
learner programme or the wartime staff colleges replaced the pscs, 
but they had been trained by pscs, like Burnett-Stuart. By filling 
the divisional staff appointments, they freed up pscs for service on 
34
Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/2
  35H O G A N 
corps and army headquarters. Serving in these headquarters in the 
later years of the war, pscs played an instrumental role in directing 
the high-tempo, successful operations of the BEF during the Hundred 
Days offensive of 1918.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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